By Marc Fleurbaey
The definition and dimension of social welfare were a vexed factor for the prior century. This publication makes a optimistic, simply appropriate concept and indicates the right way to evaluation the commercial scenario of a society in a manner that offers precedence to the worse-off and that respects each one individual's personal tastes over his or her personal intake, paintings, rest, etc. This procedure resonates with the present main issue to move "beyond the GDP" within the dimension of social development. in comparison to technical reports in welfare economics, this publication emphasizes optimistic effects instead of paradoxes and impossibilities, and indicates how you can begin from uncomplicated rules of potency and equity and prove with concrete reviews of guidelines. in comparison to extra philosophical remedies of social justice, this e-book is extra unique concerning the definition of social welfare and reaches conclusions approximately concrete regulations and associations in simple terms after a rigorous derivation from essentially acknowledged ideas.
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Extra resources for A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare (Econometric Society Monographs)
4 Equal-Split Selection For all E = (RN , ) ∈ D, if ( / |N| , . . , / |N |) ∈ P (E), then ( / |N| , . . , / |N|) ∈ max|R(E) Z(E). Another way of escaping the impossibility is by restricting application of the transfer principle to pairs of agents having the same preferences. 1. 6. No-envy versus Pareto this prevents any crossing of indifference curves as in the above figures. Ethically, the fact that agents have the same preferences guarantees not only that both prefer the bundle with more of every good, but also that this unanimous (among the two concerned agents) ranking of bundles extends to all Pareto indifferent allocations.
This questions the intuition that when an agent is above another in all dimensions, he or she is undoubtedly better off. There is a paradox here. Any monotonic preference relation values a greater bundle more, so when an agent has more of every good than another, all agents are unanimous in considering that this agent has a better bundle. 5 There is a tension between different facets of the idea of respecting unanimous preferences. There are two possible ways out of the impossibility. One can weaken or forget the efficiency requirements, or adopt weaker versions of the transfer principle.
10 It relies on the same valuation of individual bundles, but applies the Nash-product social welfare function instead of the leximin criterion. 11 10 11 It is inspired from a family of SOFs proposed by Eisenberg (1961) and Milleron (1970). These authors are less specific about the utility indices to be used, because they focus on the case of homothetic individual preferences. In their particular context, any choice of a homogeneous utility representation of individual preferences yields the same social ordering.
A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare (Econometric Society Monographs) by Marc Fleurbaey